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Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran have had a problematic relationship for the last four decades. Despite 
their tense relations, Israel is home to thousands of Persians and Iran has the second largest Jewish population in 
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thematic analysis and Identity Process Theory, this article examines the construction and management of 
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political institutions in Iran and Israel construct barriers to dual identification, individuals deploy creative 
strategies for constructing an ethnic identity that acknowledges both components of their heritage. The 
implications for self-identity are discussed. 
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Iran and Israel share similarities in their ideological stances on how ethno-cultural minorities 
should relate to the nation state. Both countries are culturally diverse – Iran is home to 
numerous ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic groups, such as the Kurds, Azeris, and 
others, while Israel has, over the period of a century, incorporated into its population 
Ashkenazi, Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews from all over the world. Yet, both countries also 
expect assimilation to the dominant ethno-cultural paradigm – an Islamo-Persian identity in 
the case of Iran (Samii, 2000) and an Israeli-Jewish identity in the case of Israel (Smooha, 
2002). The dominant expectation is that one is first and foremost an Iranian or an Israeli, 
rather than an Azeri or a Moroccan, for instance. Moreover, despite the tense relations 
between the two countries, Iran is in fact home to the second largest Jewish population in the 
Middle East, and up to a quarter of a million Israelis claim to have some Persian ancestry. 
There has been much research into cultural identity among various ethno-cultural 
groups in Israel (e.g. Lerner, 2011; Peled, 1998; Singh, 2009) and, to a lesser extent, among 
minority groups in Iran (e.g. Elling, 2013; Samii, 2000; Sanasarian, 2000). However, in an 
ideological context in which assimilation is required and in which Iranian/Persian and 
Israeli/Jewish identities are socially represented as incompatible, it is unclear how Iranian 
Jews and Persian Israelis perceive and manage cultural diversity within the self-concept, and 
how they make sense of “incompatible” identities. Through the qualitative accounts of 
Iranian Jews and Persian Israelis based in Iran and Israel, this article explores the multiple 
ways in which ethnicities are constructed, challenged and managed within the self. 
 
Iran and Israel: from friends to foes 
In order to understand the sociological and political context in which Iranian Jews and 
Persian Israelis construct and manage their identities, it is necessary to explore the 
development of historical and political relations between Israel and Iran. Shahvar (2009) 
describes the long-standing antisemitism of Shiite Islam (which is the dominant 
denomination of Islam in Iran) which has persisted in present-day Iran. For instance, during 
the Qajar dynasty (1785-1925), Iranian Jews faced blood libel accusations, persecution, 
forced conversions – the forced conversion of Mashadi Jews to Islam in 1839 being an 
infamous case - and even pogroms (Levy, 1999; Tsadik, 2005, 2010). However, the Pahlavi 
dynasty (1925-79) is generally considered a “golden age” for Iranian Jewry. This 
	   2 
improvement in the treatment of Jews has been attributed to the decreased influence of Shia 
clergymen, which also saw the abolishment of forced conversions to Islam and the notion that 
non-Muslims were “najes” (unclean). Although approximately a third of Iranian Jews 
emigrated to the State of Israel in the years following its establishment (Lesham & Shuval, 
1998), the remaining Jews in Iran generally ascended the socio-economic ladder and 
established themselves as an important ethno-religious group in science, education and 
commerce in Iran. 
When David Ben-Gurion declared the independence of the State of Israel on 14 May 
1948, Iran became the second Muslim-majority country (after Turkey) to recognize the newly 
established state, and the two countries came to enjoy bilateral relations. As two non-Arab 
countries in the predominantly Arab Middle East, Iran and Israel became natural allies, which 
was consistent with Ben-Gurion’s notion of the Alliance of the Periphery (Ram, 2009). 
Indeed, Israel had a permanent delegation in Tehran which served as its de-facto embassy, 
and there were important economic and military collaborations between the two countries.  
In 1979, Khomeini successfully led the Islamic Revolution, which deposed the Shah 
of Iran and installed a theocratic regime in Iran. Anti-Zionism became a key ideological 
component of Iranian foreign policy and all ties were cut with the State of Israel. Since then, 
the Iranian government has systematically referred to the Jewish State by delegitimizing 
terms, such as the “Zionist regime” and “Occupied Palestine,” and has called for its 
destruction (Jaspal, 2014b). In addition to its active dissemination of delegitimizing social 
representations, Iran is a major funder of organizations committed to the destruction of Israel 
(Palmer-Harik, 2004). Although Iran recognises the Jews as an official religious minority and 
rejects accusations of antisemitism, the former Iranian president’s repeated denial of the 
Holocaust, coupled with the often interchangeable use of the categories “Jew” and “Zionist” 
in political discourse, has led some commentators to argue that antisemitism is widespread in 
Iranian state ideology (Michael, 2007). 
On the other hand, Israel has repeatedly threatened military action against Iran, which 
could be attributed to what Bar-Tal (2000) calls the Israeli siege mentality, that is, the 
widespread societal belief that outgroups (and particularly Iran) unanimously intend to inflict 
harm and damage on Israel, that Israelis cannot rely on outgroups for help, and that Israel is, 
therefore, alone in a hostile and threatening world. Research has found that Israelis of all 
backgrounds view Iran as the “prototype” of antisemitism because of its outspoken rejection 
of the State of Israel as well as the Iranian government’s repeated Holocaust denial (Jaspal, 
2014a). Moreover, the political and public perception in Israel that Iran is pursuing a nuclear 
weapons programme and that the international community is not doing enough to curtail this 
has further accentuated the siege mentality, precipitating public support for pre-emptive 
military action against Iran (Ram, 2009). 
Israeli-Iranian relations have undergone significant changes over the last few decades 
– the two states have gone from being friends to foes. Given the prominent representation of 
intergroup threat in the mass media, political rhetoric and societal thinking (Jaspal & Coyle, 
2014; Klein, 2009), coupled with the ideology of assimilation that underpins both nation-
states, it is likely that self-identification as both Persian/Iranian and Jewish/Israeli could 
present potential social and psychological challenges. 
 
Cultural Diversity in Iran and Israel 
Cultural diversity is characteristic of Israel and Iran alike. While there have been several 
insightful studies of Israeli Jewish communities, such as Russians, Ethiopians, Indians and 
others, there are few English-language empirical studies of Jews of Persian descent (e.g. 
Philips & Khalili, 1995; Goldstein, 1998) and none that have examined the identities of both 
Iranian Jews and Persian Israelis. 
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 Today, Iran has the largest Jewish population in the Middle East outside of Israel - 
recent estimates suggest that approximately 25,000 Jews remain in Iran (Jaspal, 2014a). As a 
recognized official Iranian religious minority, the Jewish people are allocated one seat in the 
Iranian parliament (majles). Moreover, Jews in Iran receive some institutional support from 
the Iranian authorities – there are several active synagogues across the country, Jewish 
schools, hospitals and publications. However, there have been reports of antisemitism 
existing at both social and institutional levels (Shahvar, 2009). For instance, some Jews 
reportedly feel scrutinised by the Iranian authorities and fear accusations of collaboration 
with Israel, which can make them feel uneasy about speaking openly about their living 
conditions in Iran.1  
The acculturation ideology underpinning the State of Israel is primarily an 
assimilationist one, which divides Israelis into the categories of Jew and Arab. Although 
there is some acknowledgement of diversity within the Jewish majority, primarily in terms of 
the categories Ashkenazi (European descent), Sephardic (Iberian, North African, Turkish 
descent) and Mizrahi (Middle Eastern, Asian descent), the diversity within these categories is 
often overlooked. Given the centrality of (secular) Ashkenazi Jewry to the Zionist project, 
this ethno-cultural group has historically been prioritized in Israel (Sasson-Levy & Shoshana, 
2013), and the “civilizing mission” of Zionism aimed to “salvage” the Mizrahi Jews by 
removing them from their exilic conditions and relocating them to the modern State of Israel 
(see Smooha, 2008). Ram (2009) describes the orientalist concept of negation of exile 
whereby Jewish life outside of Israel is regarded as exilic and incomplete. This is further 
reiterated by the Hebrew expression “la’asot aliya” (הילע תושעל), which constructs settlement 
in the Land of Israel is a spiritual ascent. Thus, emigration to Israel and assimilation to the 
Ashkenazi cultural ideal are viewed as necessary for Jews (Sasson-Levy & Shoshana, 2013). 
Indeed, accounts of Jewish life in Iran tend to emphasise hardship and persecution, 
which can simplify the Iranian Jewish experience (e.g. Menashri, 1991). However, these 
commentators have also observed that, of all of the Mizrahi migrant groups in Israel, the 
Iranians are the most committed to their Iranian cultural origins. For instance, Netzer (1981, 
p.26-27) noted “Iranian Jews are attached to the state and culture of Iran […] The mother 
tongue of the Iranian Jew is Persian. He values it and he thinks and creates in that language,” 
and that “[t]he Jews sought with all their might to look Iranian. They strove hard to identify 
with the values and symbols of secular Iranian nationalism, on the one hand, and to remain 
Jewish in their religion, on the other hand” (Netzer, 1988, p.13). In the absence of recent 
empirical research, it is unclear how Jews self-identify in a contemporary Iran in which 
mainstream nationalism is neither secular nor accommodating of non-Muslim majorities.  
Goldstein’s (1998) research into Iranian ethnic identity in Israel has identified a 
revival in ethnic consciousness among young Israeli adults of Iranian descent. It is 
noteworthy that this research was conducted during an era of decreased tensions between Iran 
and Israel, and it is unclear how Israelis of Iranian ethnicity construct their identities in a 
context of renewed political tension (due partly to the enduring negative effects of 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency and Iran’s nuclear programme) in which the possibility of war has 
been widely discussed. 
 
Cultural diversity and the self-concept 
Acculturation research demonstrates the important interactions between not only state 
ideology and the acculturation orientations of minorities, but also between the acculturation 
preferences of the host majority and those of minorities (Bourhis et al., 1997). While this 
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work explains how acculturation and cultural diversity function within societies, there is less 
research into how these social processes function at an individual level. Chryssochoou (2014) 
has argued that Identity Process Theory from social psychology can enable us to understand 
and theorise how individuals themselves internalize and manage acculturation and cultural 
diversity within the self-concept.  
As a social constructivist framework, Identity Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986) 
conceptualizes identity as an ever-changing product of both sociological and psychological 
processes and the interactions between them. Individuals construct their identities in ways 
that provide them with optimal levels of culturally esteemed “identity principles” – these 
include (1) self-esteem, (2) distinctiveness, (3) continuity, and (4) self-efficacy. Moreover, at 
a psychological level though this is determined largely by societal conventions, individuals 
must perceive a degree of coherence between elements of their identities. For instance, self-
identification as both Iranian and Jewish may challenge the coherence of identity in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, where Iranian national identity is predicated on the Islamo-Persian 
ideal. Managing cultural diversity in the self-concept may pose challenges for the 
aforementioned identity principles, which will in turn motivate individuals to attempt to 
restore them (Breakwell, 1986). Accordingly, this article explores how Iranian Jews and 
Persian Israelis manage cultural diversity within the self despite stigma surrounding such 
diversity. 
 
METHOD 
 
Fifteen Israelis of Persian heritage who resided in Tel Aviv (Israel), and 13 Iranian Jews 
based in Tehran (Iran) were invited to participate in an in-depth semi-structured interview 
study concerning “the Iranian Jewish/ Israeli Persian identity experience”. The 28 
interviewees were aged between 18 and 30 (mean=26, SD=3.3). Of the 15 Israelis, 10 were 
male and 5 were female and, of the Iranians, 8 were male and 5 were female. As part of the 
interview, respondents were asked to describe their connection (if any) with relevant social 
categories: all of them described themselves as either “moderately” religious Jews; 10 
Iranians described their Iranian identities as “important” while 3 described it as “not very 
important”; all 15 Israelis described their Israeli national identities as “very important”; all of 
the Israelis described their Persian ethnic identities as either “fairly” or “very” important; and 
all of the participants were either “fairly” or “very” politically engaged. The sample was 
relatively educated – all of the respondents had completed, or were studying towards, a 
university degree. 
The interview schedule tapped into: (i) self-identity, and particularly ethnic, religious 
and national identification; (ii) knowledge of Iran and Israel; (iii) the potential challenges of 
the aforementioned forms of identification in particular social contexts; (iv) potential 
connections between relevant identities, and (v) perceptions of relevant outgroups and 
intergroup relations. The Israeli participants were all interviewed in Tel Aviv – at either their 
homes at on the Bar-Ilan University campus. The Iranian respondents were interviewed over 
Skype or the telephone. The interviews were conducted in either Hebrew or Persian, and were 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
The data were analysed using qualitative thematic analysis, which has been described 
as “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006, p. 78). The study aimed to capture participants’ attempts to make sense of their 
personal and social worlds, with particular foci upon the construction of ethno-cultural 
identities and the connections between them. During the analytic phase, preliminary 
interpretations were noted in the left margin of each transcript. These included inter alia 
participants’ meaning-making, particular forms of language, and apparent contradictions and 
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patterns within the data. Initial codes aimed to capture participants’ perceptions and 
experiences in relation to their identities. The right margin was then used to collate these 
initial codes into potential themes, which captured the essential qualities of the accounts. This 
process was repeated for each transcript and eventually a list of superordinate themes, 
reflecting the major themes identified in both individual transcripts and the entire dataset, was 
developed and is described in this article. The list of superordinate themes was reviewed 
rigorously against the data in order to ensure their compatibility and numerous interview 
extracts were listed against each corresponding theme. 
Participants’ names have been replaced with pseudonyms. Their pseudonyms, 
national identities and genders are indicated in the extracts below. In the quotations, an 
ellipsis indicates where material has been excised; and other material within square brackets 
is clarificatory. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The challenges and maintenance of dual identification 
The interviewees described the challenges of ethnic and national co-identification due to the 
negative social representations associated with Iranian identity in Israel, on the one hand, and 
of the negative representations of Israel in Iran, on the other. Psychologically and culturally 
valued identities were rendered problematic in both national contexts: 
 
I have two homelands in my view. If you ask me what I am, well, I’m half and half. 
Iranian and Israeli…Of course, it’s a big challenge. Israel hates Iran, my homeland, 
and Iran also hates us (Avi,Israeli,male) 
 
I’m not Israeli. I’m an Iranian and I’m very proud of this fact but as a Jewish Iranian, 
Israel does have a special place in my identity but you can’t say this ever. You can just 
feel it (Babak,Iranian,male) 
 
The use of terms such as “homeland” and “special place” in relation to both Israel and Iran 
illustrated their cultural and psychological importance. Moreover, Avi described himself as 
“half and half”, thereby appending a similar degree of importance to both facets of his 
identity and rejecting the notion of a hierarchy. This attests to the importance of both national 
and ethnic identification even in a context in which Israeli national identity is clearly the 
culturally valued identity. Similarly, although Babak did not self-identify as Israeli, he did 
append significance to Israel as a symbol of his Jewishness. This is in stark contrast to the 
social representation of Israel as an illegitimate state in Iranian political and public 
consciousness and to the government-supported notion that Iranian Jews are invariably 
opposed to Israel (Shahvar, 2009). Although the Iranian participants clearly held a distinct 
social representation of Israel and regarded this as a symbol of Jewish identity, this 
representation was in conflict with their Iranian national identity, at least in the public 
domain, as highlighted by Babak. Similarly, Avi regarded his “half and half” identity as 
challenging because of tense Israeli-Iranian relations. Despite these challenges, interviewees 
derived social psychological benefits from dual identification:  
 
Kids used to make fun of me at school. Like “what’s this food you eat?” and “this 
language you speak” and “you’re a stingy Persian”, you know, the stereotypes. I just 
wanted to speak Hebrew and just be an Israeli…It [being Iranian] makes me feel good 
now. It didn’t before it does now. I’m proud (David,Israeli,male) 
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It’s so important for us to remain who we are because the government pushes towards 
uniformity (Arezoo,Iranian,female) 
 
Like David, the majority of Israelis and Iranians derived self-esteem from their Iranian and 
Jewish identities, respectively. Although there was widespread consensus that social 
representations of these identities were negative especially in school contexts, individuals had 
developed strategies for focussing on the positive aspects of these identities and thereby 
derived a positive self-conception from them (Gecas, 1982). For instance, David described 
his experiences of being teased because of his overt adherence to Iranian cultural norms. 
Moreover, he reported that his individual identity was obscured by group-level stereotypes 
regarding Persians. This compelled him to desire assimilation to what he perceived as “Israeli 
culture” and consequential disidentification from his Iranian heritage, as Zionist ideology 
suggests (Smooha, 2002). However, David reported satisfaction with his Iranian heritage and 
this now constituted a source of self-esteem. Similarly, for Arezoo, her Jewish identity was 
central to her self-concept, which she explained in reference to the government’s attempt to 
establish uniformity among Iranians. Thus, the manifestation of her Jewish identity provided 
a means of safeguarding distinctiveness from others. 
 Ethnic identification can provide individuals with a sense of continuity over time 
(Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2012). By speaking Persian and utilising other Iranian cultural aspects, 
some of the Israeli respondents were able to derive continuity: 
 
I used to hate speaking Persian because the kids at school would just laugh and make 
fun…Now I speak it much more and I answer my mother in Persian when she speaks to 
me in Hebrew…It’s my way of keeping the link (Sara,Israeli,female) 
 
Like David, Sara too reported stigma in relation to her Persian ethnic identity, particularly her 
schooling experience, which had induced a desire to attenuate her connection with Iranian 
culture. However, in adulthood, she developed a desire to use the Persian language with her 
Iranian-born mother (Goldstein, 1998). Indeed, there was a perception among several 
interviewees that their Persian heritage and ethnic identity were challenged by the hegemony 
of (Ashkenazi) Israeli national identity (Sasson-Levy & Shoshana, 2013). Like Sara, several 
respondents reported the gradual loss of their Persian heritage, which they exemplified by 
citing their Iranian-born parents’ gradual preference for the Hebrew language in accordance 
with the assimilationist orientation of Israel. Thus, by continuing to speak the Persian 
language, some individuals believed that they were “keeping the link” with their heritage and 
maintaining its continuity into the future. 
 The desire to maintain a connection with one’s ethnic and cultural heritage was often 
exemplified by the desire to reconnect, at least psychologically, with others of Persian 
descent, thereby defying the taboo surrounding Iranian-Israeli relations: 
 
Iranian food, it’s a beautiful cuisine. Why should we be ashamed of this? I’m not. I love 
Korme Sabzi. It’s something we have in common with Iranians, to say “we eat the 
same” (Liran,Israeli,male) 
 
We still keep the link with Israel. We listen to Radio Israel in our own home and we 
discuss Israel in our religious class…In Iran we’re not always being watched. You 
should be careful but it’s possible (Behruz,Iranian,male) 
 
Liran viewed his penchant for Iranian cuisine as a unifying bond with Iranians, that is, as a 
means of connecting with others in his ethnic group. This enabled some Israelis to derive a 
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sense of belonging within Persian culture, despite the common representation of Israelis as 
“Other” in Iran (Shahvar, 2009). Like other Persian Israelis who pointed to the “beauty” of 
the Persian language, Liran emphasised the “beautiful cuisine” of Iran and its ability to evoke 
pride, rather than shame. Thus, by engaging in common cultural practices (e.g. eating Persian 
food), all of which induced pride, individuals were able to liberate themselves from the 
stigma that they had previously experienced.  
A similar observation can be made in relation to the accounts of Iranian Jews, many 
of whom defied the dominant social representation of Israel as “Other” by engaging in 
cultural practices that facilitated self-alignment with Israel, a symbolically important identity 
element. For instance, Behruz explicitly invoked his desire to “keep the link with Israel”, 
despite Iran’s curtailment of any communication with Israel. Respondents reported listening 
to Israeli radio in order to maintain a sense of connection with Israel. Given the tensions 
between the two states and the lack of communication between their respective peoples, 
several respondents reported their attempts to keep abreast of developments in Israel by 
listening to Israeli radio. Moreover, they maintained a connection with Israel by discussing it 
in religious classes and in “safe” Jewish forums in Iran to avoid detection from the Iranian 
authorities. Although Behruz acknowledged the necessity of exercising caution in 
manifesting his connection to Israel, he noted that it was possible to do so within primarily 
Jewish contexts. 
Some individuals clearly derived a sense of safety and security from the knowledge that 
Israel existed as a Jewish State, that is, as a safe haven for world Jewry. Although some 
defensively emphasised the safety of Jews in Iran, there was also some acknowledgement of 
the political volatility of Iran, exemplified, in their view, by the tendency of the Iranian 
government to scapegoat minority groups. Consequently, the existence of Israel represented a 
psychological “exit option” or, as in the words of one respondent, a “back-up option” in the 
event of extreme political instability. Furthermore, interviewees referred to threats faced by 
Jews and other minority groups in view of the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) group: 
 
They [ISIS] killed all the Iraqis in the Sinjar because they were minorities and they’ve 
gone far, far into Syria and Iraq. You can never trust the past and guess the future. If 
they came to Iran, the Jews would be killed first and then everyone else…Jews are safe 
in Israel (Aziz,Iranian,male) 
 
Like Aziz, several respondents described the fears and uncertainties about the political future 
of Iran and the region, more generally, and concurred in their perception of Israel as a safe 
haven for the Jewish people. They substantiated their fears by describing violence against the 
Yazidi people at the hands of ISIS in Northern Iraq due to their religious minority status. 
Individuals were sceptical about the safety of Jews in Iran, and some of them perceived the 
mass genocide of Iranian Jews at the hands of ISIS as plausible. Yet, like Jahan and Aziz, 
interviewees regarded Israel as a beacon of hope amid fear and uncertainty. Despite their 
disagreement with some Israeli policies, they nevertheless rejected the notion that Israel 
should be destroyed. After all, many perceived Israel as the Jewish homeland. 
 
Breaking Down Boundaries Between Identities 
In attempting to reconcile seemingly divergent identities, some individuals may seek to 
establish connections or commonalities between them (Amiot et al., 2007). In view of the 
social and psychological functions performed by identification with the stigmatised category, 
it was unsurprising that individuals should attempt to maintain this connection despite social 
and political challenges: 
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In Iran it’s OK to be Jewish even though the media says it’s not…We cannot speak in 
favour of Israel but they can’t tell what is in your mind and in your heart and we 
cannot think the way they [government supporters] think about Israel 
(Farrokh,Iranian,male) 
 
I’m Iranian but I’m also part of the Jewish nation…Every day that I pray 
and…maintain our customs, I show that I’m part of the Jewish nation and this lives 
on...We will not disappear (Firoozeh,Iranian,female) 
 
Most Iranian Jewish participants laid claim to their Iranian national identity, often in the form 
of a sentimental national attachment (Kelman, 1997), in addition to their Jewish ethno-
religious identity, and rejected the notion that these identities were in any way incompatible. 
For instance, Farrokh responded defensively to the interviewer’s suggestion that there might 
be tensions between these identities and attributed this perception to erroneous media 
reporting. Similarly, Firoozeh emphasized her membership in the “Jewish nation” in addition 
to her Iranian national identity and challenged negative assumptions about Iran. Interviewees 
noted that, while it was possible for the Iranian authorities to regulate public manifestations 
of support, it was conversely impossible for them to regulate private manifestations of 
support or connection. Firoozeh and others reported doing so privately, often in prayer, and in 
cultural practice. Thus, the symbolic attachment to Israel clearly possessed a religious 
dimension, which itself had been accentuated among Iranian Jewry in the wake of the Iranian 
Revolution that rendered salient religious identities (Sanasarian, 2000). 
In order to maintain a sense of ethno-cultural continuity in the face of growing tensions 
between their identities, individuals sought to blur the reified boundaries between them. 
Persian Israelis were particularly aware of the tensions characterising Iranian-Israeli relations 
and perceived the Iranian authorities, rather than the Iranian people, as responsible for these 
tensions: 
   
We do not blame the people in Iran. It’s a mad government. They do not reflect what 
the people think…I don’t think Iranian people hate us because we have many 
similarities in fact. They are brainwashed…We used to live, my parents told me, we 
used to live side by side, and in the same street so Persians, Jewish or Muslim or 
Zoroastrian, we're all one and in Israel we can live like this, the government loves 
freedom (Nati,Israeli,male) 
 
The Iranian government was dismissed as “mad” and unrepresentative of the Iranian people, 
while anti-Zionism in Iranian society was seen as the outcome of a political programme of 
brainwashing. All of the interviewees had been exposed to narratives of positive intergroup 
relations between Persians of different faiths from relatives who had lived in Iran prior to the 
Islamic Revolution. They drew strategically upon these social representations in order to 
affirm their belief in the possibility of positive intergroup relations and the sense of ethnic 
“one-ness” that respondents desired.  
Among Iranian Jews, there was a sense of alienation from both the Iranian authorities 
and the Israeli government, which allowed them to focus on “the people” and thereby break 
down the perceived boundaries between their identities: 
 
The things that they [the Iranian government] say about the Holocaust, it shows what 
kind of people they are. This is not my history, my identity or my people…Israel’s 
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government and many of them it’s about war and power and control so it's hard for me 
to see how they can represent the Jewish people. (Esta,Iranian,female) 
 
Israel is bad and Iran is bad. They are both bad. The government, yes, but not the 
people. The people of both are good. Iranians are “one”. (Morteza,Iranian,male) 
 
Esta and Morteza delineated Iranian/Israeli politics from the Persian people and argued that 
neither government adequately represented the Persian people. This allowed them to 
emphasise the unity of the Persian people (both Jewish and non-Jewish) and to externally 
attribute the apparent emerging disunity of the people to the policies of these governments. 
Like Esta, several Iranian interviewees exemplified the distasteful nature of the Iranian 
government’s repeated Holocaust denial, which was not seen as characteristic of Iranian 
thinking or history (Litvak, 2006). Conversely, individuals perceived Israel as defensive and 
belligerent, traits that they did not view as characteristic of the Jewish people. Interestingly, 
while most Israelis were highly critical of the Iranian government but rather defensive of the 
Israeli government (as exemplified by Nati’s account above), Iranian Jews appeared to 
disidentify from both. Their accounts evidenced a sense of political fatigue and a desire to re-
focus on Persian (Jewish) society. This could be attributed more generally to the siege 
mentality that has been described in relation to Israeli society (Bar-Tal, 2000). 
 Although Iranian Jews were often critical of the Israeli government’s policies, many 
were also ambivalent about Israel. On the one hand, they recognised the stigma surrounding 
any sense of identification with Israel but, on the other, there was some unease about the 
overt demonization of Israel observable in Iran: 
 
“Israel” is like a bad word for Iran so I think of us as the Jewish people only and we 
are all connected (Dilshad,Iranian,male) 
 
When they say “death to Israel”, yes, it makes us feel insecure and we don’t like it. We 
don’t want to say these words…However, the government of Israel takes many bad 
decisions and this makes the problem worse because we cannot have a relationship 
with the people of Israel who are Jews like us (Jahan,Iranian,male) 
 
Some respondents accepted the stigma surrounding identification with Israel and, in 
accordance with Iran’s policy of using terms such as “Occupied Palestine”, avoided 
references to Israel/the Jewish State (Jaspal, 2014b). Dilshad, for instance, recognised that 
Israel had become a “bad word for Iran”. Instead, he referred to “the Jewish people”, which 
included both Israelis and world Jewry who, in his view, were “all connected” by their ethno-
religious identity. This constituted a creative means of delineating society and politics. 
However, like most Iranian interviewees, Dilshad and Jahan did recognise Israel as the 
Jewish State and therefore took offence at Iran’s frequent political chants calling for the 
destruction of the State of Israel. Examples like this highlight the socio-psychological need 
for establishing coherence in identity. 
 
Persian/Iranian or Jewish/Israeli? Establishing coherence in identity 
There are widespread cultural perceptions of mutual threat between Israel and Iran (Klein, 
2009). This can create tensions between Iranian-Persian and Israeli-Jewish identities, which, 
as exemplified by the data presented in this article, individuals endeavoured to synthesise and 
reconcile: 
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I say “Persian” and when I think of this, I don’t know, I think more about the people 
and great culture and civilization of Persia…Iran has got these negative connotations 
for me because I just think of Ayatollah and hatred of Jews (Talya,Israeli,female) 
 
Respondents were asked to reflect upon their use of the Hebrew term “Parsi” [יסרפ] (Persian) 
rather than “Irani” [ינריא] (Iranian) in self-definition. Tayla described the positive social 
representations associated with the term Persian, which evoked imagery of the “great culture 
and civilization of Persia”. For most individuals, the term Persian represented a cultural 
category with emphases on history and society, rather than politics. Conversely, the terms 
“Iran” and “Iranian” evoked negative social representation due to the association, in the 
minds of participants, with theocratic politics, the Ayatollah, and antisemitism (Shahvar, 
2009). It is noteworthy that the Israeli, and even some of the Iranian, respondents perceived 
the Iranian theocratic regime as antisemitic, exemplified by reference to state-sanctioned 
Holocaust denial in Iran. Given that the category “Iran” appeared to activate negative and 
threatening social representations in people’s minds, many felt uncomfortable 
accommodating this category in their identities, preferring the more culturally-oriented 
category “Persian”. As a category devoid of any political connection, “Persian” was more 
readily accommodated in identity. Similarly, among Iranian Jews, there was a clear 
preference for categories and terms that evoked imagery of Judaism, rather than Israel, 
because of the socio-political difficulties surrounding public manifestations of identification 
with Israel.  
The Israeli respondents attempted to re-construe their Persian identity in order to render 
it more compatible with their Israeli identity: 
 
I prefer not to think about the situation [in Iran] now. Why should we focus on Iran 
after 1979? Why not the beautiful history of Iran that there was before and that there 
still is in the culture? This makes me proud to be Persian (Yasmin,Israeli,female) 
 
Yasmin disengaged from negative social representations of Iran by refusing to think about 
post-1979 Iran. She questioned the necessity of focussing on post-Revolution Iran, rather than 
the “beautiful history of Iran” that had preceded it, and the long-standing positive aspects of 
Persian culture which are often overshadowed by negative social representations of Iran. 
Some respondents nostalgically reminisced about the Shah’s era, which has been described as 
the “golden age” for Iranian Jewry (Shahvar, 2009). Persian Israelis had access to social 
memories of pre-1979 Iran due to cultural artefacts in Persian Jewish contexts in Israel, e.g. 
the displaying of photos of pre-1979 Iran in restaurants and cafeterias. These social memories 
enabled them to derive pride and, crucially, self-esteem from their Persian heritage. 
 As an identity that could provide feelings of self-esteem, respondents were more able 
to perceive linkage between it and their (more established) Israeli identity: 
 
We are really quite different from the other groups in Israel. We speak our language. 
We have our culture and we are proud of it…For us, there’s no competition with being 
Israeli at all (Tal,Israeli,male) 
 
The state ideology of Israel is an assimilationist one and that there is, thus, an implicit 
cultural expectation that Israelis will abandon their ethnic backgrounds in favour of a shared 
Israeli identity (Bourhis & Dayan, 2004). Tal and others highlighted the distinctiveness of 
Persian Israelis vis-à-vis Israelis of other backgrounds in that Persian tend to retain their 
cultural and linguistic heritage more readily than other groups. Given that this may be viewed 
as problematic in assimilationist societies where the abandonment of subordinate cultures is 
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socially normative, several interviewees spoke of a long-standing compatibility between their 
Israeli national and Persian ethno-cultural identities between which “there’s no competition.” 
By naming and, thus, constructing their connection with Iran in favourable terms, Israelis 
were able to synthesise their ethno-religious and ethno-national identities.  
To further enhance identity coherence, both Iranians and Israelis manifested a tendency 
to assign distinct “functions” or roles to each of their identities: 
 
Iran is my home because I was born here. My family is here…but I think Israel is a land 
of opportunity for me because my life is limited in Iran…Israel is a safe country for 
Jews (Behruz,Iranian,male) 
 
Behruz clearly perceived Iran as “home” and wished to continue to live in Iran but, like many 
Iranians, he discussed the possibility of emigrating to Israel. However, in practical terms, he 
regarded Israel as a foreign country and, thus, emigration as a “big step”. His perception of 
Iran as “home” and Israel as a “land of opportunity” echoed Kelman’s (1997) distinction 
between sentimental and instrumental forms of national attachment – while some respondents 
clearly held a sentimental and emotional attachment to Iran, the country in which they had 
been socialised, they simultaneously perceived an important connection to Israel due partly to 
the social, political and economic opportunities that the country offered them as Jews. 
Moreover, the psychological security that Israel could offer also contributed to respondents’ 
sense of identification with the country. In short, the two identities – Iranian and Israeli – 
were present in the identity structure but clearly held different meanings and performed 
distinct psychological functions: 
  
I’m Iranian and my origins are in Iran. It’s important to me. My soul is Jewish and 
Israel is related to the soul. Also very important (Arezoo,Iranian,female) 
 
Wherever a Jew is, Israel means something because it’s part of our birthright, I believe. 
Each Jew has a place on earth where they lived and sort of what we became, if you 
understand me, our identity (Asaf,Israeli,male) 
 
By describing a component of identity concerned with her “origins” and another focused on 
her “soul”, Arezoo distinguished between her ethnic and spiritual “selves”, respectively (see 
William, 1890). She regarded her Iranian identity as pertinent to her ethnic self and, like most 
Iranian respondents, attributed significance to this component of identity. Conversely, her 
Jewishness and indeed her attachment to Israel, a country she had never visited, were 
attributed to her spiritual self. The two selves were viewed as equally important in 
constituting her identity – one simultaneously possesses both an ethnicity and a soul 
(William, 1890). By attributing the two potentially conflicting identities (Jewish/Israeli and 
Iranian) to distinct “selves” or components of the identity structure, thereby creating a form 
of compartmentalisation within identity (Roccas & Brewer, 2002), Arezoo was quite able to 
perceive these selves as compatible and harmonious in identity. 
Asaf, an Israeli, engaged in a similar psychological process - he perceived Jewishness 
and Israeliness as pertinent to the spiritual self, given Israel’s connection with the “birthright” 
of all Jews, regardless of their location or background. Like Arezoo, he viewed his country of 
origin as important in defining the distinctiveness of his identity (vis-à-vis Israelis of other 
backgrounds). The spiritual self was constructed as being immutable and general to all Jews, 
while one’s country of origin defined “what we become”, that is, the individuality and 
distinctiveness that each (Jewish) ethnic group comes to possess. This was, thus, a source of 
distinctiveness in an assimilationist context in which intergroup difference is attenuated 
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(Vignoles et al., 2002). In short, both components of identity were regarded as making 
important contributions to identity and, thus, necessarily compatible.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study explored how multiple identities are constructed, experienced and managed among 
Iranian Jews and Israeli Persians, respectively. Identity Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986) 
provides the heuristic tools for understanding how these social psychological processes 
function at an individual level against the backdrop of dominant social representations 
(including state ideology and perceptions of the “Other”). The theory allows us to integrate 
the social and psychological levels of analysis, which has been largely absent from 
mainstream social sciences research into identity (Moghaddam, 2002).  Identity Process 
Theory enables us to understand the potential social, cultural and psychological 
underpinnings of social identification. It focuses on the motivations underlying our patterns 
of identification, that is, what the social, cultural and psychological reasons for aligning 
oneself with a particular group may be.  
Iranian Jews and Persian Israelis manifested an attachment to their Iranian/Persian 
and Israeli/Jewish identities because these identities provided feelings of self-esteem, 
continuity, distinctiveness and belonging. There was, thus, a social psychological incentive 
for identifying with them (Vignoles et al., 2002). Although there was some evidence that the 
two identities posed challenges for coherence, interviewees had clearly developed a more 
positive relationship with the socially stigmatised group membership (Jewishness in the 
context of Iran and Iranian-ness in the context of Israel). For instance, the Israelis reported 
feelings of shame in manifesting their Iranian identity at school but had clearly come to re-
evaluate it in more positive terms. Indeed, as Goldstein (1998) has argued, many young 
Israelis of Iranian heritage have rekindled their relationship with their Iranian identity and 
derive self-esteem from this group membership. Furthermore, although Iranian Jews 
manifested a strong attachment to their Iranian-ness, several perceived an attachment to Israel 
as they construed it as a safe haven for Jews. This can be explained by the perceived lack of 
safety and security for Jews in the Middle East (Litvak, 2006). Crucially, both Iranian Jews 
and Persian Israelis viewed their ethnicities as providing a unifying thread between their past 
and present and, thus, enhanced the continuity principle of identity, which is consistent with 
social psychological accounts of ethnic identity (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2012). 
Yet, Israeli/Jewish and Iranian/Persian identities are socially represented as being in 
conflict with one another in both the Iranian and Israeli contexts, which can impinge upon 
perceptions of identity compatibility among individuals themselves and, thus, challenge the 
coherence principle of identity. In an article published in Ethnicities, Jaspal and Cinnirella 
(2012) explored both sociological and psychological approaches to ethnic diversity within the 
self, examining concepts of “identity compartmentalization”, “hybridity and “new 
ethnicities”, proposing Identity Process Theory as a framework within which they can be 
collectively examined. When group “identities” are reified in public and political discourses, 
as they certainly have been in the contexts of Israel and Iran, they become tangible things to 
think about and they become inter-connected in the minds of individuals. Both Zionist-Israeli 
and Islamist-Iranian discourses have constructed tensions between these identities, which 
compels individuals at the intersection of these group memberships to take a stance on the 
coherence of their identities. This is a subjective process - as Jaspal and Cinnirella (2010, p. 
866) point out, “psychological coherence is in the eye of the perceiver and not some objective 
quality of the identities under scrutiny”. This is subjective partly because people differ in 
their level of awareness and acceptance of relevant social representations (Breakwell, 2001).  
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The two identities may be perceived as irreconcilable and inherently antagonistic in 
view of the threat representations that underpin contemporary Israeli-Iranian relations – in 
Israel, Iran is represented as attempting to build a nuclear bomb to annihilate Israel, while in 
Iran, Israel is constructed as an anomaly in the “Muslim Middle East (Jaspal, 2014b; Klein, 
2009). The siege mentality has been described in relation to Israeli society (Bar-Tal, 2000), 
but it is also observable in predominantly Shia Muslim Iran (Mokhtari, 2005). Individuals 
may perceive it as implausible for a “loyal” ingroup member to express an attachment to an 
“enemy state.” Moreover, the divide between these identities is reinforced by the existing 
cultural priority appended to Ashkenazi Jewish Israeli identity in Israel (Ram, 2009) and to 
Islamo-Persian identity in Iran (Samii, 2000). 
Although the problem of identity incompatibility persisted, individuals attempted to 
cope with potential threats to the principle through the deployment of “coping strategies” 
(Breakwell, 1986). At a very basic level, individuals attempted to focus upon aspects of their 
identities perceived to be compatible or reconcilable – for instance, they emphasised 
similarities between Israeli and Iranian customs and delineated people from politics, 
especially when the politics of Iranian-Israeli relations were viewed as the source of identity 
incompatibility. This is consistent with the integration stage of social identity integration 
model proposed by Amiot and colleagues (2007). Moreover, it is noteworthy that, in the 
context of Israeli-Iranian relations, social representations have changed radically over time – 
the two countries went from being friends to foes. Individuals may draw upon positive 
historical representations in order to deflect the apparent intractability of the intergroup 
conflict between the two states, thereby attenuating the perception of conflict and rendering 
the two identities more reconcilable than is usually supposed. 
The identity categories themselves evoked particular social representations (see Jaspal 
et al., 2015 for evidence of this in the context of climate change labels), and individuals may 
adopt terms or labels for their identities that foster a sense of coherence, rather than 
incoherence. For instance, Israelis preferred the category “Persian” to “Iranian” due to the 
more culturally-oriented social representations of the former versus the politically-oriented 
representations of the latter (see Philogène, 2001 for another example of this categorisation 
process). Furthermore, interviewees attributed functionality to their identities so that each one 
was perceived as performing a function and, thus, possessing a purpose. This is analogous to 
the compartmentalization strategy that has been described in theories of multiple identity 
construction (Amiot et al., 2007; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). While compartmentalization 
describes a strict delineation of identity components, which limits contact between them, 
thereby decreasing scope for threats to identity coherence, our data suggest that individuals 
attribute a function to each identity and thereby associate it with a distinct dimension of the 
identity structure. The aim is not to limit contact between the elements but to justify their 
presence in the identity structure by emphasising the distinct functions that they perform for 
identity. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the State of Israel may be political foes with distinct 
worldviews, but within these countries there are people whose identities cut across these 
political boundaries. Iranian Jews and Persian Israelis are aware of the social stigma 
surrounding their Persian/Iranian and Jewish/Israeli identities, but these identities remain 
important to them due, at least partly, to the benefits that these identities have for the identity 
principles of self-esteem, continuity and so on. However, due to the stigma of these identity 
configurations, individuals may confine their identities to the private domain and eschew any 
public manifestation of them, which may be aversive for wellbeing (Sedlovskaya et al., 
2013). Furthermore, given Iran’s legal restrictions on manifesting support for the State of 
Israel, Iranian Jews understandably worry about their safety. People should be able to identify 
in ways that are important and meaningful to them, and should not be constrained by state 
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ideologies that require a particular form of identification. After all, identity authenticity is 
important for social and psychological wellbeing (Vannini & Franzese, 2008). Yet, in deeply 
assimilationist societies like Israel and Iran, identity authenticity may be severely impeded 
with negative consequences for wellbeing. Thus, both Iran and Israel should create the social 
and political contexts in which identities can be assimilated, accommodated and manifested 
without fear of discrimination. This will require a cultural shift in these countries so that 
people who identify as Iranian/Persian and Israeli/Jewish are not positioned as “outsiders” 
but rather as insiders within the superordinate Israeli and Iranian ingroups. 
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